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Lessons not learnt from 26/11

We are novices at handling terror or intelligence or diplomacy. Just look at the faux pas of Republic Day Chief Guest invitation. We missed the build-up across the border before Kargil. Our agencies and politicians never learn. They are so focussed on fighting each other. Some even join our Nation’s enemies.

Look at “Aadhaar” which, I call, “Sham ID” because it is not an ID card. Yet, almost all people, including Supreme Court refer to it as "Aadhaar card". It is a letter acknowledging enrollment and assigning an allegedly unique number. The letter tells the recipient to cut a portion of it and use it.

The letter also informs the recipient that it is not proof of citizenship. It can’t differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. Still, RBI, banks encourage its use as KYC.

EC would like to link it to names in voter lists. Does not EC know that resident non-citizens should not be in our voter lists? Worse, the de-duplication process to assign the ostensibly unique number is done by foreign private companies. Does EC want foreign entities to control enrolment into our voter lists. I had written to EC explaining this but did not receive any reply.

Even our Armed Force personnel are asked to enrol in Sham ID, 'Aadhaar'. As per UIDAI’s contracts with Biometric Solution Providers (foreign entities), all data is not only provided to them but they are also authorised to do whatever they wish to with the data. No one realises that the deployment and movement of our Defence Forces would be known minute-by-minute to external agencies.

Our PM uses an iPhone given to him by Apple’s Tim Cooke!

Back to tackling 26/11 type situations. Our police need helicopters and drones. Is anyone in government even contemplating provision of these?

As for intelligence, we are so gullible that despite Snowden, most Indian government departments have Facebook pages and Twitter handles.

To prevent another 26/11, our intelligence agencies need to be more intelligent – use their brains. We did not even insist on interrogating David Headley in India. He was certainly not a DEA agent turned rogue. That’s what they would have us believe. No need for watch lists. He was travelling between US, Pakistan and India. Even an idiot cop at the immigration counter could have smelt a rat.

Below is an article from "Outlook" Magazine datelined 15-11-2018

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Dead Man Speaks - Exposes Sham ID Aadhaar 

Can't Identify without Sham ID Aadhaar Number, says UIDAI

“Not possible to use biometrics to identify bodies: UIDAI”

Says, the headline in ‘The Hindu’ datelined 12 Nov 2018.

Reporting a statement made in the Delhi High Court, the paper quoted UIDAI as telling the court that it is not possible to use biometrics to identify (dead) bodies.

UIDAI’s justification? ‘Matching done on 1:1 basis and Aadhaar number is needed’

So, all the b******t about unique identities lays exposed by a dead man talking through a PIL.

This is exactly what I have been requesting anyone who will listen to understand – “Biometrics cannot identify people across large populations.”

If biometrics cannot identify a person if it is not matched in the UIDAI database against the Sham ID number, then how can it be used to issue unique numbers or de-duplicate? In de-duplication, the Sham ID number is not issued. So, the biometrics of the person enrolling has to be checked against all people already enrolled in the database.

UIDAI now admits that it cannot identify without the Sham ID number because 1:1 matching, that is, a person’s biometrics has to be checked only against her / his biometrics already stored in the database.

Here’s the link to the article in ‘The Hindu’

 

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Sham ID Aadhaar Supreme Court Judgment with My Comments

The PDF below is the Sham ID Aadhaar Judgment with my comments.

The main points I made therein are the following.

1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court missed the fact that the UIDAI contracts with Biometric Solution Providers are illegal because, the entire data is not merely handed over to these private companies, but they are also authorised to collect (more data), use, store, transfer, process and link the data to individuals. This fact appears to NOT have been brought to the notice of the Court. 

  1. The contracts violate the Act which, says in Section 29 that data cannot be shared except under certain specific circumstances. If the Act is valid, (which, in my view, it is not) as per the Supreme Court, then the contracts are invalid. If the contracts are invalid, all data collected under the contracts are illegally collected and hence, cannot be used for purposes of the Act.
  2.  The Sham ID Aadhar number is for all residents. It make no distinction between non-citizen residents and citizens. Hence, it cannot be used a KYC for any purpose for which citizenship is essential. This fact too is not mentioned anywhere in the judgement.
  3.  The Court assumed that biometrics results in unique identities. This is disproved by both scientific research and mathematical proof. It is substantiated by ground data which shows millions, 80 million people – to be exact – have been excluded due to false matches, that is, one person’s biometrics being mistaken for another’s. This is an inherent property or fallibility of biometric identification systems. De-duplication of biometric identities in large populations is impossible.

 

 

 

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The Sham ID Called, Aadhaar

I have authored and published a book by the above title.

Here is its cover page.

One may think / ask:

What New Material Could There Be on "Aadhaar"?

A book has been written about the Sham ID called, Aadhaar! Why on earth would someone do that? Well, here's why.

And to top it all, it’s titled, “The Sham ID, 'Aadhaar'”.

"Aadhaar" or should it be termed here, “Sham ID”, has been in the news for almost a decade.

All that is to be said about it has been said – some say, “It’s a surveillance tool”, some decry exclusion, others are worried about privacy rights.

Corporate honchos are concerned about DIN being linked to Aadhaar numbers. People are – were until recently – anxious about the inability to file tax returns without Aadhaar number.

So why a whole book, and that now, when the Supreme Court judgment is just around the corner?

Well, there is a whole lot of facts, hitherto unknown, or rather unnoticed by the public and ignored by media (wilfully?) in the Book. It has 22 documents in appendices published as, incontrovertible documentary evidence of wrongdoing by those behind the scheme. It provides 54 weblinks. It lists over 100 reported crimes/frauds using the Sham ID, ' Aadhaar'.

Why is it called Sham ID? Because that’s what it is – A Sham – something which it is not what it purports to be!

Almost all have been fooled into believing that "Aadhaar" is here to stay. The minuscule minority who think otherwise, have misgivings, but don't know why.

The brand name, "Aadhaar", has been used to mystify and befuddle. Phrases like, “use Aadhaar", "Aadhaar" enabled, "Aadhaar" linked, leverage "Aadhaar" are employed to confuse and confound.

Intriguingly, only Pakistan and India are the two countries with such biometric ID schemes and coincidently, employ the same foreign firms as contractors for biometric technology.

The Book is purposed to tell India the truth about the Sham ID for the first time.

Thus, it provides evidence of the entire data not only being handed over to foreign private companies but also, their being authorized to use, store, transfer, process and link it to other personal data which, they are allowed to collect. It questions, “Why are we being told lies about data security, data not shared?”

Secondly, the Book gives scientific and mathematical proof which, exposes the whole charade of unique biometric IDs. There are no detected duplicates, but millions of false matches – one person’s biometrics matching millions of others’ in the database.

Thirdly, the Book reveals how UIDAI has no knowledge of who is enrolled in its database. The enrolling and process of assigning numbers are under the control of foreign firms whose details UIDAI attempted to hide.

Fourthly, the Book proves that the Aadhaar Scheme is not one which, provides identities, but a system of assigning allegedly unique numbers to individuals, numbers which, are neither unique to individuals nor uniquely identifies them. People have more than one Aadhaar number and millions (80 to 180 million) are eliminated as "duplicates", while spies, illegal immigrants, terrorists all – non-citizens too – have obtained the (magic) number.

Fifthly, the Book illustrates why none of the objectives of the Aadhaar Act can be achieved using the Sham ID, 'Aadhaar'.

Sixthly, the Book suggests simple and effective ways in which, subsidy theft may be prevented.

Lastly, the Book anticipates the likely Supreme Court judgment and in a call to action, lays down a path to protect the Nation and people from banking and impersonation frauds apart from securing the country's cyberspace.

Mathew Thomas                                        Wednesday, 29 August 2018

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CBDT Circular - Extending Date for PAN-Sham ID-Aadhaar Link

UIDAI Deceit Continues Despite Circular

Here is the above circular extending the date for PAN-Sham-ID-Aadhaar link to 31-03-2019.

Despite this, the online tax filing software prevents tax payers from doing so.

UIDAI deceit continues, as this example shows.

Considering that Nilekani who was the originator of the Sham ID scheme, and he is now Chairperson of Infosys which provides software services to Income Tax Department, one may not only smell a rat, but the rat has an unbearable stink!

Copy of the Circular is below

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