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Electoral Bonds and Foreign Funding - FCRA
The Electoral Bonds Act of 2018 has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
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Where is Justice When Torture is the Norm?
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Sham ID - "Aadhaar" - Not Proof of Address, DoB: High Court, Lucknow
Finally, a confession by UIDAI, whose implications are lost on the people and media and political establishment.
This is published in a news item in the 'Times of India', Bangalore edition, dated 27-01-2019.
Ms. Jasmine, /UIDAI Lucknow, regional office deputy director filed an affidavit and appeared in the High Court to say, "Aadhaar is only proof that a person obtaining subsidy or service is the same person who enrolled after providing biometrics and documents. If a resident does not have valid date of birth document, it is recorded on the basis of declared date. If the date is approximate, the age is verbally communicated by the resident to the operator based on which the year of birth is calculated. By default, the date of birth is recorded as January 1 of that calendar year.
After the by UIDAI, the court said, name, address, gender, address and date of birth on the Aadhaar card can't be taken as conclusive proof.
Most people, including judges, call the Sham ID, 'Aadhaar' a “card” which it is not. It is merely a number in a database.
UIDAI deliberately fosters the false notion of an ID card since, that is what people want. This is one many deceits of UIDAI.
The claim that the allegedly unique number is unique to the person in the database to which the biometrics is linked is also false.
At enrolment, when the biometrics captured is compared to the millions of those already in the database, there would be millions of false matches. The mathematical probability of false matches is 1 in 10.
There is no way of knowing which of these millions of false matches is the right one. In other words, to whom does the set of biometrics actually belong.
Once the database links it a person, it assumes that the biometrics really is that of the person to which it has linked it and issued a number.
So, what do we have here?
We do not know whether the demographic data – DoB, age, gender, address or any other information is right or wrong.
All that is there is a number linked to someone’s biometrics which the database claims is that of X, Y or Z.
And people and authorities are to accept this false claim as Gospel truth.
And then use it a KYC for everything from passports to rations.